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There are two commonly held beliefs about the subjects’ 
rights in Hobbes’s political theory. First, that the right to 
self-preservation amounts to no more than a narrow right to 
defend ourselves against attack and to strive to preserve our 
lives in the most literal sense. Second, that the right to self preservation 
offers no protection for the Hobbesian subject 
against the (absolute) power of the sovereign. This second 
thesis is usually said to be the consequence of one or both of 
the following: first, the right to self-preservation, along with 
all other Hobbesian rights, is of no benefit to the right holder 
because it is merely a freedom or liberty right and therefore 
not correlated with any duties on the part of others. (Such 
rights, the argument goes, are rights in name only1 and offer 
no protection to the subject and no curb on the sovereign 
power). Second, the right to self-preservation is of no benefit 
to the Hobbesian subject because the sovereign is absolute 
and may do what he wishes to the subjects with impunity. 
The subjects, in other words, hold no rights against the 
sovereign.2 
 
The Hohfeldian assumptions underlying this reasoning are: 
first, that a liberty right consists in a bare freedom only and 
offers no protection to its subject because it is never correlated 
with duties on the part of others to refrain from interference or 
to assist the right-holder and second, as above, that liberty 
rights are the only kind of rights held by Hobbesian subjects. 
In this paper I will argue against the two theses regarding 
Hobbesian rights set out above. First, I will argue for a different 
way of understanding the right to self-preservation in 
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Hobbes’s theory, which has, in my view, been interpreted far 
too narrowly.3 I will look first at the scope of the right to 
selfpreservation 
and second, at its relationship to the role and 
responsibilities of the sovereign. I shall argue that the right to 
self-preservation, at least as it is presented in Leviathan, is much 
broader than is generally realised and encompasses far more 
than a basic right to self-defence. I shall also make the claim 
that it holds greater political significance than it has usually 
been accorded because, while not directly correlated with any 
duties of the sovereign, the sovereign does have certain 
responsibilities as sovereign and these do protect the rights of 
the subjects, albeit in an indirect way. This view has no obvious 
supporters amongst Hobbes scholars, although a leaning towards 
elements of it can be found in the works of Edwin 
Curley,4 Conal Condren5 and, perhaps most significantly, Jean 
Hampton.6 
For Hampton, the possible implications of the self-defence 
right (part of the right to self-preservation), which is retained 
into the commonwealth, are so serious as to render ‘‘the entire 
Hobbesian justification for absolute sovereignty invalid.’’7 I 
shall say something about Hampton’s argument below but first 
I shall present my own argument, on the extensiveness of 
Hobbes’s right to self-preservation and on its implications 
regarding the requirements of the office of sovereign and the 
indirect check on the sovereign’s power they provide. I will 
argue that the right to self-preservation amounts to what I call 
the right to full preservation. And in asking what kind of right 
this is, I shall explore its relationship to the sovereign requirement 
to procure the safety of the people and to guarantee the 
peace. The right to full preservation becomes, after the institution 
of a sovereign, a protected right, not quite a claim right, 
in the Hofeldian sense, because it is not directly correlated with 
the sovereign’s duties and yet it is protected by what the sovereign 
must do to fulfil his office as sovereign. As will become 
clear, the Hohfeldian terminology of _claim rights’ and _liberty 
rights’ can be misleading and I will say something about the 
difficulties of applying this kind of _rights talk’ to Hobbes’s 
theory. 
The Hobbesian sovereign is famously outside the contract 
made between individuals in the state of nature, when they 
agree to form a commonwealth and commentators on Hobbes 
have often made the case that on entering civil society the rights 
of the individual subject are either given over to the sovereign in 
return for his protection or are rendered useless once the 
sovereign is in place.8 Hobbes makes it clear, however, that 
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there are certain rights, pertaining to our self-preservation, 
which cannot be given up. We enter society for the sake of our 
preservation and, as Hobbes says, we can never give up the 
right to defend and preserve ourselves. ‘‘[N]o man can transferre, 
or lay down his Right to save himself from Death, 
Wounds, and Imprisonment,’’9 
 
A. The Right to Self-Preservation 
 
Hobbes first discusses the right of the individual to preserve 
herself, when he describes the state of nature. In this context, 
the right forms the basis of the aggregate right to _all things’ 
that is the right of nature. 
 
The RIGHT OF NATURE, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is 
the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the 
preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; 
and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own 
Judgement, and Reason, here shall conceive to be the aptest 
means thereunto.10 
 
This right to preserve ourselves exemplifies what a right is for 
Hobbes. It is a justified freedom or liberty to do or to forbear 
from whatever actions will help us preserve ourselves. He 
famously distinguishes between right and law, saying, ‘‘they 
ought to be distinguished; because RIGHT, consisteth in liberty 
to do, or to forbeare; whereas LAW, determineth, and bindeth 
to one of them: so that Law, and Right, differ as much as 
Obligation and Liberty; which in one and the same matter are 
inconsistent.’’11 This seems clear enough; where there is a liberty 
there is no obligation or duty; in other words one is free to 
act or to forebear from acting and this freedom is normative; 
one is under no duty. Unfortunately, this clarity is undermined 
by Hobbes’s definition of liberty as the absence of external 
impediments,12 which leaves liberty as meaning merely (physically) 
unrestricted. There is not the space here to discuss this 
further. I shall assume a normative element attaches to a liberty, 
at least as is implied in the distinction he draws above 
between a law and a right – that it is a lack of obligation to do 
otherwise – as well as a physical freedom. 
The right to preserve ourselves is generally referred to as a 
liberty right, by commentators on Hobbes, following Hohfeld’s 
analysis of rights in the legal literature.13 This right to preserve 
ourselves, unlike many of the other rights that make up the 
aggregate right of nature (the right to all things in the state of 
nature)14 is, however, retained into the commonwealth. So, 
after transferring and giving up those invasive rights that militate 
against a state of peace,15 
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Hobbes insists that we hold onto our right to self-preservation. 
 
… there be some Rights, which no man can be understood by any words, or 
other signes, to have abandoned or transferred. As first a man cannot lay 
down the right of resisting them, that assault him by force, to take away his 
life; because he cannot be understood to ayme thereby, at any Good to 
himselfe…16 
A Covenant not to defend my selfe from force, by force, is alwayes voyd, 
For (as I have shewed before) no man can transferre, or lay down his Right 
to save himself from Death, Wounds, and Imprisonment,17 
 
I shall say more below about the nature of this right that has 
been carried into the commonwealth, but first I shall address 
the question of what is included under it. The right to self preservation 
is a right to what exactly? 
 
B. Content of the Right 
 
The right to self-preservation has usually been defined narrowly 
as the right, literally, to preserve our lives. ‘‘[N]o one can give 
up those rights that are necessary for self-preservation: the right 
of resistance or the right of self-defence.’’18, ‘‘It is clear that 
[Hobbes] believed that our only natural right is the right barely 
to preserve ourselves, and to use whatever means we take to be 
necessary for that purpose,’’19 This narrow definition of the 
right to self-preservation fits well with the right as Hobbes 
describes it in the Elements of Law and in De Cive, ‘‘ … it is not 
against reason that a man doth all he can to preserve his own 
body and limbs, both from death and pain…. It is therefore a 
right of nature: that every man may preserve his own life and 
limbs, with all the power he hath.’’20 ‘‘ … things are done by 
right of nature, and are held to be so done, if they necessarily 
contribute to the protection of life and limb.’’21, In Leviathan, 
however, Hobbes broadens the right to self-preservation. If one 
looks at the next part of the passage quoted above, from 
Chapter 14 of Leviathan, where Hobbes describes why individuals 
must give up the invasive rights held under the right of 
nature, there is a hint at the much more extensive right to 
preservation that Hobbes now has in mind. 
 
…And lastly the motive, and end for which this renouncing, and transferring 
of Right is introduced, is nothing else but the security of a mans person, 
in his life, and in the means of so preserving life, as not to be weary of it. And 
therefore if a man by words, or other signes, seem to despoyle himselfe of 
the End, for which those signes were intended; he is not to be understood as 
if he meant it, or that it was his will; but that he was ignorant of how such 
words and actions were to be interpreted.22 
 
Here Hobbes draws our attention to the scope of the right he is 
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describing. Now we are not only concerned with preserving our 
physical lives but also with _the means of so preserving life, as 
not to be weary of it’. We must preserve what we might now 
call our quality of life as well as our mere physical survival. 
And in the context of arguing that the right to self-preservation 
is not to be given up he says the following. 
 
As it is necessary for all men that seek peace, to lay down certaine Rights of 
Nature; that is to say, not to have libertie to do all they list: so it is necessarie 
for mans life, to retaine some; as right to governe their own bodies; enjoy 
aire, water, motion, waies to go from place to place; and all things else 
without which a man cannot live, or not live well.’’23 
 
Here we start to see the extent of the self-preservation right that 
Hobbes is now arguing for. Not only do we have a right to what 
is necessary for survival but also to _all things else without 
which a man cannot live, or not live well’ and this would include, 
for example, bodily integrity and freedom of movement. 
(Later, in Chapter 30, when Hobbes discusses the office of 
sovereignty he refers to the safety of the people and says. ‘‘But 
by Safety here, is not meant a bare Preservation but also 
all other Contentments of life, which every man by lawful 
Industry, without danger, or hurt to the Commonwealth, shall 
acquire to himselfe’’24). We have a right, in other words, to 
what is necessary not just to live but to live a good life, to live 
what Hobbes would call a commodious life. And this right, he 
says, must not, indeed cannot, be given up, but must be 
retained into the commonwealth. 
Hobbes’s commitment to this extended right to self-preservation 
will become clearer when I look at the move into a 
commonwealth and what he says there regarding the right. For 
now, it is enough to say that, according to his argument in 
Leviathan, there is an inalienable right, not only to preserve our 
lives, that is, to avoid death, but also to what is needed for us to 
live a life that will be worth living. So, we must retain from the 
right of nature (that gave us a right to any action or thing we 
thought we needed for our preservation), the right to those 
things or actions that will enable us to live a commodious life. 
Indeed, if we should seem to agree to anything that would 
_despoyle’ ourselves of the end towards which we aim in 
transferring and renouncing some of our rights, in accordance 
with the second law of nature, (as above from Chapter 14 of 
Leviathan,) then we are not to be understood as though we 
meant it. 
 
C. Full Preservation 
 
The right to self-preservation, in Leviathan, which Hobbes says 
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cannot be alienated but must be retained by each individual 
into the commonwealth, amounts to a right to what I shall call 
_full preservation’. This right to what Hobbes would call a 
commodious life, amounts to the right to a life in which individuals 
are able to enjoy at least the minimum freedoms that 
are required for an active and full life. It includes the right not 
only to preserve our lives but also to the conditions that are 
necessary for basic human well-being or flourishing. For 
Hobbes it is after all a commodious life that we aim at in 
forming ourselves into a commonwealth and this is often 
overlooked by commentators who see him as assuming that we 
are solely concerned with our physical preservation. ‘‘The final 
Cause, end, or Design of men, … in the introduction of that 
restraint upon themselves, … is the foresight of their own 
preservation, and of a more contented life thereby;’’25 The rights 
that Hobbes mentions, under the aggregate right to preservation, 
include: the right to self-defence, the right to resistance, 
the right to whatever is required to preserve ourselves, the right 
to basic minimal freedoms such as the right to govern our own 
bodies, the right to enjoy _air, water’, the right to freedom of 
movement and the right to engage in _lawful industry’ in order 
to furnish ourselves with the normal _contentments of life’. 
If I am right about the aggregate right to full preservation, it 
is a far cry from the _bare preservation’ right that is assumed by 
most commentators. The fact that it is inalienable and carried 
into the commonwealth by each individual means that it also 
has some implications for the theory as a whole and particularly 
for the (supposed) absolute power and authority of the 
sovereign. 
 
D. What Sort of Right? 
 
The right to self-preservation starts out, like all rights in 
Hobbes’s theory, as a right of nature; a simple liberty; a justified 
freedom to any action that I deem necessary to preserve 
myself while in a state of nature, which is of course, a state of 
war. As I have shown above, the right to self-preservation 
(which, I have argued, amounts to the right to full preservation) 
is not given up or transferred to others in return for protection, 
as invasive rights are, under the second law of nature. The right 
to self-preservation is retained into the commonwealth. What is 
its status after the institution of a sovereign and the erection of 
a commonwealth? Does it remain a simple freedom, which 
merely leaves individuals free to compete against one another 
for survival? 
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E. The Right to Self-preservation Becomes a Protected Right 
 
The reconstruction of Hobbes’s argument that I am suggesting, 
explains how individuals become protected by instituting a 
sovereign, in terms of the right to full preservation. This 
aggregate right becomes protected in a Hobbesian commonwealth 
by the actions and responsibilities that are required of 
the sovereign if he is to fulfil the purpose of the office with 
which he has been trusted. 
 
F. Securing the Peace and Protecting the People: the Sovereign’s 
Role 
 
The right to full preservation is protected in the commonwealth 
in two ways; first, by the fact that individual subjects 
have given up their invasive rights under the second law of 
nature, and taken on duties to stand out of each others’ way 
when exercising their transferred rights.26 Second, the right to 
full preservation is protected by the sovereign, whose 
responsibilities as sovereign include those to: secure and 
maintain the peace, protect individual subjects and provide 
 
26 ‘‘… when a man hath … abandoned or granted away his right; then is 
he said to be OBLIGED, or BOUND, not to hinder those, to whom such 
Right is granted, or abandoned, from the benefit of it: and that he Ought 
and it is his DUTY, not to make voyd that voluntary act of his own:’’ 
Hobbes (1968, p. 191). In other words when someone transfers an unacceptable 
(invasive) right or liberty to another, she is then obliged to stand 
out of the way of the person to whom she has transferred the right when 
they exercise that right. So, for example, if I transfer my right to your body 
(which I have under the right of nature which is the _Right to every thing; 
even to one anothers body’ Hobbes (1968, p. 190)) I am then obliged to 
stand out of your way or not to interfere with you when you exercise your 
right to your body. You now have what could be said to be a claim right to 
your body, because it is now directly correlated with my duty to respect it 
and not violate it. In the mutual transferring of all invasive rights that must 
happen when individuals conform to the second law of nature, we are left 
with no invasive rights over others and with comprehensive duties not to 
violate the remaining allowable rights that we hold on to. At the same time, 
those _allowable rights’ have become claim rights, as above. For a more 
detailed presentation of this argument see, Curran, Eleanor, _Hobbes’s 
Theory of Rights – a Modern Interest Theory_, The Journal of Ethics, 
6(2002): 63–86. 
 
and maintain the conditions necessary for a commodious life. 
When Hobbes describes the setting up of a commonwealth 
and the instituting of a sovereign he makes it clear that the 
purpose of such actions is to secure the peace and protection 
of individual subjects. 
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The only way to erect [such] a Common Power, as may be able to defend 
them from the invasion of forraigners, and the injuries of one another, 
and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their owne industrie, 
and by the fruites of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live 
contentedly; is, to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or 
upon one Assembly of men, …. This done, the Multitude so united in one 
Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine Civitas. This is the 
Generation of that great Leviathan, or rather (to speake more reverently) 
of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the Immortal God, our 
peace and defence.27 
 
So, we institute a sovereign in order to gain security and the 
conditions necessary to live an active and contented life. 
‘‘And because the End of this Institution, is the Peace and 
Defence of them all;’’ …28 
The sovereign is required to ensure that the commonwealth 
achieves or remains in a state of peace. And the sovereign must 
provide protection for the subjects. The passage from Chapter 
30 of Leviathan quoted in part above, can now be seen to describe 
this requirement. 
 
The Office of the Soveraign, (be it a Monarch, or an Assembly,) consisteth 
in the end, for which he was trusted with the Soveraign Power, namely the 
procuration of the safety of the people; to which he is obliged by the Law of 
Nature, and to render an account thereof to God, the Author of that Law, 
and to none but him. But by safety here, is not meant a bare Preservation, 
but also all other Contentments of life, which every man by lawfull Industry, 
without danger, or hurt to the Commonwealth, shall acquire to himselfe.29 
 
G. Does the Sovereign Have _Duties’? 
 
In the passage above, Hobbes uses the term obligation, to say 
that the sovereign has a moral obligation to procure the safety 
of the people. We can be satisfied that he means a moral obligation 
or duty because it comes from the law of nature, which 
refers to the moral law30 and to _the author’ of the moral law – 
God. Much has been made of the fact that Hobbes says that the 
sovereign owes duties to God rather than to the subjects and of 
the _fit’ between this and his insistence that the social contract is 
made between individuals and not between the sovereign and 
the subjects.31 We can be clear that there is no contract between 
the sovereign and the subjects and that there are therefore no 
contractual duties of sovereign to subject. And yet the sovereign 
does have duties and I suggest that he has two kinds of duties. 
First, he has the moral, duty outlined in the passage above, to 
procure the safety of the people, which includes providing the 
necessary conditions for a commodious life. This moral duty is 
controversial in several ways. Depending on which view one 
takes of Hobbes’s moral theory, one might say, for example, 
that the theory, being subjectivist and egoistic, has no place for 
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the notion of moral duty which is a deontological notion.32 Or 
one might say that these moral duties are duties held in _foro 
interno’33 only and so bind the sovereign in conscience but not 
in action.34 And so, disagreements about the nature of the 
moral theory being described by Hobbes mean one can interpret 
what Hobbes means by the sovereign’s moral duties, in 
several ways. I shall leave these difficult issues concerning 
Hobbes’s moral theory aside and argue instead for a second 
type of duty held by the sovereign. 
As well as moral duties, the sovereign has duties that exist 
simply as requirements of the office of sovereign. As the passage 
above, from Chapter 21, states; it is the end or purpose of 
the office of sovereign, _for which he was trusted with the 
Soveraign Power’ that the sovereign should procure the safety 
of the people. And there are real and dramatic consequences for 
the sovereign if he fails to do so. If the sovereign fails to protect 
the people then _the Subjects are absolved of their obedience to 
their Soveraigne’35 because as he famously tells us ‘‘the Obligation 
of Subjects to the Soveraign, is understood to last as 
long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able 
to protect them.’36 
And so, I argue, the Hobbesian sovereign, as well as having 
moral obligations, (which, for the present purposes, I am 
leaving undefined), also has responsibilities, which he holds 
simply by being sovereign; to fulfil the end of the office he 
holds, namely to procure and maintain the safety of the people. 
And the office itself is so tied to these responsibilities, that any 
sovereign who fails to fulfil them, will lose all the rights of 
sovereignty. 
Whoever is sovereign, she (or they) must protect the people 
and provide or maintain the conditions necessary for subjects to 
be able to preserve themselves and to have the basic freedoms 
necessary in order to live a commodious life. And the position of 
sovereign is tied to these responsibilities in such a way that one 
cannot be sovereign without fulfilling them. I can, therefore, call 
these responsibilities _duties’, not as moral duties, but as duties 
in the sense of requirements of a job or position, such that those 
duties define the job or position, just as, say, duties to teach 
define the job of teacher. A person cannot be a teacher without 
teaching and carrying out the duties that make up the role or 
position of teacher. If the teacher fails to: take classes, explain 
what material is to be covered, instigate and chair discussion, 
instruct, etc., then she is no longer a teacher. 
It is these sovereign duties; to protect the subjects, ensure 
peace and provide or maintain the conditions for a commodious 
life, that protect the right to full preservation of each subject. 
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They protect the individual subject’s ability to exercise the rights 
that fall under the aggregate right to full preservation. For 
example, the right to freedom of movement can be exercised 
under a sovereign who legislates and governs to ensure that 
subjects are able to move freely about the commonwealth. If the 
sovereign were to, say, write and enforce a law that stated that 
all subjects must hold identity papers and not be allowed to 
move out of their own district, then the sovereign would be 
failing in her duties as sovereign and the subjects would be 
unable to exercise their right to freedom of movement. 
 
H. Duties Owed to Whom? 
 
If the duties I have described as attaching to the office of 
sovereign are not owed to the subjects, then to whom are they 
owed? Two possible options are; that they are owed to the 
office itself or to the person or people who placed her in that 
position (analogous to the employer). Yet, there is a difficulty 
with the second option, because, as I have already pointed out, 
Hobbes emphasises the lack of contract between the sovereign 
and the subjects. So, the duties are owed to the office itself or to 
the commonwealth, rather than to the subjects. 
These duties of the sovereign are not incidental. His right to 
rule is dependant upon his ability and willingness to carry them 
out. Indeed, if he should fail in his duty to protect the people 
then, as above, ‘‘[s]ubjects are absolved of their obedience to 
their Soveraign’’37 And furthermore, it is the subjects who must 
decide when their obligation to obey the sovereign has ceased, 
for only they can decide when they are no longer being protected. 
They have held on to their right to full preservation. It 
has not been given up to the sovereign, and rights such as the 
right to self-defence would make no sense if they could only be 
exercised on the say so of the sovereign; so subjects must be free 
to make judgements as to when they are being protected and 
when not and as to who can protect them and who cannot. 
‘‘The end of Obedience is Protection; which, wheresoever a man 
seeth it, either in his own, or in another’s sword, Nature applyeth 
his obedience to it, and his endeavour to maintaine it.’’38 
What could Hobbes mean by ‘‘wherever a man seeth it’’ except 
that it is the man who decides where his protection lies? 
This latter point has potentially far reaching implications for 
the (supposedly absolute) authority of the sovereign and the 
rights of the subjects. If the subjects can decide that they are not 
being protected and if, at the point of critical mass, the sovereign 
loses the right to rule, then his (the sovereign’s) authority 
cannot be said to be absolute. To argue comprehensively 
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against the absolutism of the Hobbesian sovereign would take 
far more than this and cannot be attempted here but the preceding 
argument about the right to full preservation and the 
duties that can be said to protect it, do at least suggest, that the 
absolute power and authority of the sovereign is undermined by 
the rights that Hobbes puts in place for the subjects. The right 
to full preservation, carried into the commonwealth by each 
subject rather than given up, combined with the sovereign duties 
outlined above, can be said to provide the beginnings of an 
argument that Hobbes did, after all, intend that the sovereign’s 
power be limited rather than absolute. 
 
I. Support from Commentators? 
 
Jean Hampton would not grant that Hobbes limits the power 
of the sovereign deliberately but she does argue that if we take 
the right to self-preservation seriously then Hobbes’s argument 
for instituting an absolute sovereign fails. She points out 
that each individual does, according to Hobbes’s argument, 
carry the right to self-defence into the commonwealth and she 
discusses the implications of this right, concluding that the 
self-defence right can be said to be ‘‘equivalent to the entire 
right to preserve oneself.’’39 Once this is admitted, she argues 
that the implication must be that Hobbesian subjects themselves 
decide whether obeying the sovereign is conducive to 
their preservation or not ‘‘and hence makes the subjects the 
judges of whether or not they will obey any of the sovereign’s 
laws’.40 She argues that if they do ‘‘retain a right to determine 
whether or not to obey the sovereign’s laws, then the sovereign 
not only fails to be the ultimate decider of every issue but 
also is not the decider of the most important question in the 
commonwealth: whether or not he will continue to receive 
power from his subjects.’’41 The conclusions Hampton draws 
from this are different from mine. Instead of reading the selfpreservation 
right as one that has real purchase and curbs the 
power of the sovereign, she reads it as demonstrating the 
failure of Hobbes’s argument for absolute sovereignty. ‘‘[W]e 
now see that Hobbes’s social contract argument is invalid: 
That argument cannot show that people, as he has described 
them, can institute what Hobbes defines as an absolute sovereign.’’ 
42 
This raises a question for my interpretation. Should I not 
also conclude that the argument is invalid? The answer to this 
seems to me to turn on what Hobbes’s intentions are 
regarding the power of the sovereign. If he is really trying to 
argue for the institution of an absolute sovereign and we 
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understand that the self-preservation right allows subjects to 
decide whether or not (and when) to obey, depending on their 
assessment of their own interests, then it seems the argument 
fails, as Hampton argues. If, on the other hand, Hobbes 
deliberately puts in place rights for the subjects that will reduce 
the power of the sovereign, then his argument has not 
failed because it is not in the end an argument for absolute 
sovereignty, despite many remarks he makes that suggest his 
support for absolutism. Employing the principle of charity, 
(according to which we hesitate before attributing fairly 
obvious mistakes to historical figures such as Hobbes), I 
would argue that it seems unlikely that he would have failed 
to see such an obvious problem with his argument. 
J. Recent Commentators – Glimpses of a Tempered Sovereign 
Commentators on Hobbes generally remain convinced of his 
absolutism but there are some whose readings of certain passages 
and arguments in Leviathan lend at least partial support 
to my argument that the apparent absolutism of the Hobbesian 
sovereign is undermined by the rights/liberties of the subjects. A 
similar point to that above, (that the subjects decide whether 
the sovereign can protect them and that this limits his authority) 
but in this case about initial authorization is made by Conal 
Condren. 
 
Hobbes’s critics have never been slow to point out that the sovereign’s 
metarights of self-definition and self-legitimation effectively give it absolute 
power in a modern sense as well as in a seventeenth-century sense of being 
without legal limitation. The other side of the equation, however, is that it 
can never be given absolute authority, despite Hobbes’s final theory of 
contractual authorization. We cannot authorize self-destruction – that 
contradicts the very reason for entering society in the first place. As he put it 
in De cive, we submit only for security and if that cannot be had, a man 
cannot be assumed to have submitted himself to anything (De Cive, 6.3; see 
also 2.18).43 
 
Here again, we can make sense of the apparent problem with 
authorisation once we say that the authorisation is conditional 
upon the sovereign fulfilling his duties. 
Edwin Curley also makes the point that we only owe the 
sovereign obedience if we are being protected and he argues 
that it is the subject’s right to decide whether the protection 
being offered by the sovereign merits obedience or not. ‘‘If he 
[the sovereign] has the power (and the will) to protect us, we 
owe him obedience. If he doesn’t, we don’t.’’44 And, 
 
Hobbes contractarian methodology does lead, inevitably, to some 
limitations 
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on the subject’s duty to obey, What makes the covenant binding 
for 
Hobbes is the rationality of the consent it involves, whether that 
consent is 
given in an initial ceremony of institution, or in daily acts of 
obedience to 
the powers that be. If there are certain things no one can 
rationally consent 
to, then the covenant must involve some limits on the subject’s 
duty of 
obedience, however absolute it sometimes seems.45 
 
He draws on Clarendon’s46 insight to push this point home. 
Those who think that Hobbes has given too much power to the 
sovereign shouldn’t worry because ‘‘if they will have patience 
till he hath finished his scheme of sovereignty, he will enfeeble it 
again for them to that degree that no ambitious man would 
take it up, if he could have it for asking.’’47 Curley also reminds 
us of the twenty first chapter of Leviathan where Hobbes outlines 
the liberty of the subject who may disobey the sovereign 
_without injustice’ under certain circumstances; such as commands 
to kill or wound himself, execute any dangerous or 
dishonourable office etc. ‘‘If the subject has discretion to 
determine when these conditions are satisfied, as Hobbes seems 
to think he would when his self-preservation is at stake… then 
his liberty might be very great indeed.’’48 
Condren argues that Hobbes’s use of the notion of _representation’ 
as the defining characteristic of the office of sovereign, 
means that the sovereign ‘‘assumes an office no less than 
the individuals who consent to become subjects. And it is in this 
pervasive sense of reciprocal office, not contract itself, that 
Hobbes provided the sense of limitation which seems to be 
lacking if we take his notions of alienation or authorization in 
isolation… an office for Hobbes and for all his contemporaries,… 
was a role or responsibility carrying rights only for the 
sake of fulfilling duties.’’49 
Condren also draws different conclusions from mine on the 
rights of the subjects. He thinks that according to Hobbes ‘‘[w]e 
alienate our rights from the natural condition’’50 and despite 
granting that ‘‘whatever rights the sovereign has, its subjects 
cannot be taken to abandon a right to self preservation’’51 he 
thinks that we are mistaken if we see Hobbes as a liberal who 
advocates individual rights. ‘‘[W]e look in vain for what might 
be adequate guarantees of individual liberty against tyranny in 
Hobbes’s state;’’52 I would argue however, that, given his 
acceptance that subjects cannot alienate the right to self-preservation 
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and that the sovereign has duties as well as rights, he 
has already granted me the important part of my argument. All 
I require in addition, is that the right to self-preservation is 
more extensive than a mere right to self-defence, that the sovereign’s 
right to rule is conditional upon his carrying out the 
duties of his office, and that in order to exercise the right to 
selfpreservation, 
subjects must be the judges of when the sovereign 
is a threat, all of which I have argued, above. 
The judgements to be made as to when a sovereign is protecting 
such rights or liberties and when he is violating them, 
are complex and difficult. Maintaining peace in the commonwealth 
will require restricting the liberties of some (rebels/law 
breakers, etc.). Judgements about the balance between the liberties 
of subjects (citizens) and the security of the society as a 
whole are always difficult and the subject of profound disagreements, 
(no less so today perhaps, than in Hobbes’s time), 
and cannot be gone into here. All I am maintaining (contrary to 
the views of most commentators) is that Hobbes’s argument for 
government, in Leviathan, recognises the need for a balance and 
(deliberately) puts in place certain principles to protect the 
rights of the subjects and (possibly) to limit the power and 
authority of the sovereign. It is not possible to know for sure 
what Hobbes’s intentions are regarding the strength of the 
individual rights he describes and the curb on sovereign power 
and authority that is implied by them when they are seen to be 
protected by the sovereign’s duties as sovereign (leaving aside, 
as before, any moral duties the sovereign may have). In 
reconstructing Hobbes’s argument in the way I have, however, 
there are interesting implications both for the tenor of Hobbes’s 
political theory as a whole and for the strictly Hohfeldian way 
in which his description of individual rights has been analysed. 
 
K. Limitations of the Hohfeldian Analyses of Rights in Hobbes’s 
Political Theory? 
 
Discussion of Hobbesian rights in the last 50 years or so, has 
largely been conducted using the Hohfeldian terminology of 
liberty rights and claim rights.53 As I have mentioned above, 
commentators argue that all the individual rights in Hobbes’s 
theory are liberty rights, or bare freedoms; rights, that is, that 
do not entail any duties on the part of others. It can then be 
argued that because there are no claim rights, there are therefore 
no strong rights, no genuine political rights, in the 
theory.54 This Hohfeldian analysis does not accurately reflect 
the rights that Hobbes describes, however. It fails to capture the 
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changes to certain rights that take place through the process he 
describes whereby individuals conform to the laws of nature 
and institute a sovereign. When individuals agree (under the 
second law of nature) to give up some of their liberties so that 
they can live together in peace and when they institute a sovereign 
who can protect them, their rights become protected, in 
the former case, by the duties of all other individuals not to 
attack or invade them55 and, in the latter case, by the duties of 
the sovereign, as defined by the office of sovereign, to secure the 
peace and protect the people. 
In this paper, I have been concerned only with the second set 
of duties; (those taken on by anyone accepting the office of 
sovereign) and with the right to full preservation, which I have 
argued is protected by those duties. The first problem with the 
Hohfeldian analysis, in relation to this set of duties and their 
relationship to the right to full preservation, is that it cannot 
account for any rights that are protected, other than by directly 
correlated duties owed to the right-holder. The second problem 
is that the Hohfeldian analysis does not allow for changes in 
rights, i.e. for one type of right to become another type of right 
or to change from, say, a simple liberty to a more complex right 
that also includes claims or entitlements. Of course, it is implicit 
in the Hohfeldian approach that rights are seen as simple and 
therefore, that apparently complex rights can always be broken 
down into the simple, atomic rights (claim rights, liberty rights 
etc.) that make them up,56 My argument, however, is that the 
right to full preservation changes from being a simple (though 
aggregate) liberty, to a protected right, once it becomes protected 
(indirectly) by the duties of the office of sovereign, but 
that it does not change into a Hofeldian claim right because it is 
not directly correlated with the sovereign’s duties, nor does the 
right itself entail any such duties. 
The right to full preservation starts out as a right of nature, 
an aggregate right that includes the right to self-defence and 
the right to resistance as well as rights to freedom of movement 
and to work. All these can be categorised as liberty 
rights or bare freedoms when they are held in the state of 
nature. They are not correlated with the obligations of others 
and are described by Hobbes as being of _little use or benefit’ 
to the right-holder57 when they are held as bare freedoms by 
all individuals in a state of nature. And even if a Hohfeldian 
analysis were to allow that a liberty right in the state of nature 
could change to a claim right in a Hobbesian commonwealth, 
the problem would not be resolved because the right to full 
preservation does not become a genuine Hohfeldian claim 
right in the Hobbesian commonwealth. 
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Rather than pushing Hobbesian rights into categories they 
don’t quite fit, it might be better to simply describe the rights 
as Hobbes describes them and try to discuss their implications 
without resorting to Hohfeldian terminology.58 And so, 
for example, we might speak of protected rights rather than 
claim rights (as above). What starts out as a liberty or 
freedom can become protected (in this case indirectly) by the 
duties of others without, as it were, losing its status as a 
liberty/freedom. Rather, it has changed from an unprotected 
liberty to a protected liberty. This leaves for another time, 
the deeper question of whether the Hohfeldian analysis itself 
is flawed, when it is applied to political rights rather than 
legal rights. 
 
L. Implications for Hobbes’s Political Theory 
 
If Hobbes does describe a right to full preservation, (rather 
than the narrow self-defence right that has been assumed by 
commentators) as an aggregate right that is carried into the 
commonwealth and if I am right in arguing that the sovereign 
takes on duties to protect the people, simply by accepting the 
role of sovereign; then with these sorts of (protected) rights 
for individuals living in a Hobbesian commonwealth, the 
relationship of sovereign to subject no longer looks like one of 
absolute power and authority. There is not the space here to 
develop these thoughts further and to argue that Hobbes 
didn’t intend (at least in Leviathan) to argue for absolute 
sovereignty would require much more, as I have said, but we 
can say that Hobbes’s political theory may, after all, include 
some form of substantive rights for subjects. And the sovereign’s 
power and authority may have some theoretical limits. 
This would mean in turn that his theory is not as far removed 
from Locke’s as has usually been assumed and that Hobbes’s 
particular (and neglected) contribution to rights theory merits 
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